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The Internal-External Security Nexus and EU Police/Rule of Law Missions 
in the Western Balkans  
 
Isabelle Ioannides and Gemma Collantes-Celador 
 
Abstract  
 Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) police/rule of law missions in the 
Western Balkans are increasingly guided by externally imposed normative agendas that 
respond primarily to EU internal security needs rather than functional imperatives or local 
realities. In line with these needs, EU police reform efforts tend to prioritise effectiveness and 
crime fighting over longer-term democratic policing and good governance reforms. In 
practice this means that police reform initiatives are technocratically-oriented, yet value 
ridden fitting EU security concerns and needs. As a result, the police reform process can be—
and often is—disconnected from the political and socio-economic reforms necessary for long-
term stability and sustainable peace. Police assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been 
shaped by a determined albeit questionable focus on organised crime and corruption. The 
focus of EU police reform in Macedonia on primarily crime fighting aspects of policing has 
compromised the functioning of the Macedonian police. Similarly, the politics of (non)-
recognition of Kosovo’s self-proclaimed independence and the intrusiveness of EULEX 
Kosovo’s executive mandate contravene meeting local challenges. 
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Introduction 
 This article challenges the official EU discourse on democratisation and good 
governance in the realm of police assistance. Rather, it argues that EU domestic political and 
security needs–important and legitimate as they may be–weigh more heavily than otherwise 
indicated in the design and implementation of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
police/rule of law missions in the Western Balkans. This prioritisation of domestic needs can 
come at the expense of local social realities and/or functional imperatives. In other words, 
police effectiveness and crime fighting can become more important than longer-term 
democratic policing and good governance reforms. 
 This is not exclusive to the EU if we take into account what Andreas and Nadelmann 
describe as the growing recognition that in a globalised world, governments are forced to 
homogenise their criminal laws, sign bilateral and multilateral agreements and collaborate 
within international institutions. Moreover, if necessary, they might also engage in ‘arm-
twisting politics […] to prod foreign governments to cooperate’1 and in the aggressive 
exportation of favoured crime control norms in an attempt to contain the domestic 
repercussions of transnational crime. 
 The ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ has become a policy of distinct interest to 
the EU, particularly in its relations with the Western Balkans. Following the successive wars 
in the former Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s, EU focus has shifted from the prevention of 
armed military conflict to conflict prevention and building sustainable peace. The 
strengthening of state institutions and the establishment of accountable and effective police, 
border police and judiciary systems, which would counter transnational crime, is considered 
essential to advancing the overall prosperity and stability of the region.  
 Simultaneously, in the last ten years, it has become increasingly evident that internal 
security concerns (e.g. radicalisation, terrorism, organised crime), and their connection to the 
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Western Balkans, have undeniably had an impact on its foreign and security policy.2 Thus, 
EU reforms in the ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ aim at gradually transforming post-
conflict societies into democratic and rule of law abiding states (in the case of the Western 
Balkans, also into full-fledged EU member states), but also enable the EU to achieve its own 
internal security objectives, in line with Rees’ and Anderson’s arguments.3  
 These internal needs translate into patterns of behaviour that in the post-conflict states 
of the Western Balkans have attempted to shape the public security institutions through a 
combination of advice (i.e. 'suggesting' reforms) and imposition. A key EU mechanism used 
during the post-conflict and stabilisation phase is the deployment of CSDP police/rule of law 
missions. This approach of strong control over the police/rule of law reform process tries to 
combine—even within a single mission—an international presence whereby limited executive 
and oversight competences (executive mandate) can co-exist with monitoring, mentoring and 
advisory roles towards the local administration (non-executive functions). This hybrid model 
has shaped to varying degrees the CSDP missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and 
Macedonia.4 In Bosnia, the EU Police Mission (EUPM)’s non-executive mandate has 
monitored, mentored and inspected the police reform process since 2003, with the capacity to 
‘suggest’, not impose, reforms. However, it could, if necessary, resort to the Office of the 
High Representative (OHR) powers. In Kosovo, the EU Rule of Law (EULEX) mission is 
engaged in the reform of the entire spectrum of civilian law enforcement institutions through 
a combination of executive and non-executive powers. While in Macedonia the two EU police 
missions (EUPOL Proxima and the EU Police Advisory Team - EUPAT) deployed between 
2003 and 2006 were non-executive, their strong hand approach, which included prescriptive 
recommendations and the EU's conditionality policy, has promoted the EU security agenda. 
 The article analyses first conceptually and then empirically the impact the motivations 
driving the EU’s foreign and security policy have on its police/rule of law missions in the 
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Western Balkans. It first examines the strengthening effects the 9/11 era has on what Andreas 
and Nadelmann describe as the ‘global reach of law enforcers’5, with clear directional shifts 
for security sector reform (SSR), including police reform and rule of law.6 While admittedly 
CSDP missions only became operational in 2003, these directional shifts and the evolution of 
the EU security agenda provide a useful framework to better understand the securitised nature 
of EU CSDP police/rule of law missions in the Western Balkans. The conflicting trends that 
permeate the EU internal-external nexus are then highlighted to situate the discussion on 
CSDP performance operationally. A third section examines the normative underpinnings of 
EU police operations. These conceptual conclusions are subsequently exemplified through the 
cases of Macedonia, Bosnia and Kosovo.  
 
The Securitization of Police Reform 
The rethinking of Cold War-related security concepts in favour of ‘human security’ 
during the 1980s and 1990s meant that—despite being born late as a concept in policy 
debates—SSR moved quickly to become the centre-piece of any discussion on best 
peacebuilding strategies for countries emerging from internal conflict. It has increasingly been 
conceived in academic and policy circles as a tool of good governance, thus leading to the 
establishment and entrenchment of the principles of transparency, democratic civilian control, 
accountability and relations with civil society actors.7 These links have indeed been present in 
the discourses that have guided police reform assistance throughout the 1990s. As the most 
visible branch of government, the behaviour of police forces has a considerable impact on 
peacebuilding strategies. Having police forces that are responsive to the needs of citizens and 
ready to protect the rights of all, and are transparent while performing their duties and 
accountable for their acts, is considered crucial when redefining state-societal relations in any 
war-torn country.8  
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 Much of the picture described so far has been called into question by the War on 
Terror, launched following the 9/11 attacks in New York. According to Rubin, the new sense 
of vulnerability brought into the picture by 9/11 has given a new direction to statebuilding and 
stabilisation operations. Western states are using this kind of operations to transform or 
strengthen certain states in agreement with their interests and needs. As Rubin explains, ‘the 
terminology deployed, the very endeavour to “build” states, and the process by which 
international mandates are defined and undertaken all reflect an inherent political dimension, 
one that is not benign and selfless but self-interested and instrumental’.9 Others, such as 
MacGinty, would argue that the current confusion between ‘peace’ and ‘order’ pre-dates 
9/11.10 Although MacGinty is not alone in putting forward this argument, there is a sense that 
9/11 has reinforced and accelerated the internationalization of crime control.11 Regardless, the 
fact is that SSR activities and its ‘normative identity’ (i.e. good governance) are in practice 
gradually disassociated. This disconnect has been described as a dangerous trend for the 
credibility and distinctiveness of SSR (and reforms in its various components, including the 
police) as a ‘force for good’ for countries recovering from internal conflicts and/or when 
assisting fragile states.12 Isacson and Ball’s study on US police assistance as a foreign policy 
tool in the post-9/11 world illustrates this point eloquently:  
 
If it is to be effective, Washington’s [...] police assistance must address the crisis 
of governance afflicting the security sectors in recipient countries, not simply the 
short-term interests of counter-terrorism, counternarcotics, geopolitics, or oil. In 
fact, these immediate interests will not be served if security assistance aggravates 
the political and social conditions that led many poor performers into their 
current crises.13  
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The post-2001 period has therefore culminated in a situation whereby international 
assistance could, if required, prioritise short-term ‘hard’ security needs that allow for a quick 
stabilization of post-conflict societies (and the threats associated with those unstable 
scenarios). This choice often comes at the expense of longer-term reforms of a more structural 
and behavioural nature linked to the democratisation of security forces and peacebuilding 
agendas (i.e. ‘soft’ security). Specifically in the field of police reform, this ‘securitization of 
international assistance’14 has particularly concentrated on hard-line policing skills that serve 
internal needs—e.g. crowd control, criminal investigation, search operations, anti-terrorist 
operations—rather than democratising law enforcement by transforming police culture and 
behaviour. The latter is a long-term process that implies, among other, tackling the socio-
political context within which the police operates, offering sufficient training on 
organisational culture, and building links between the police and society.15 
Moreover, the increasing emphasis in the post-9/11 world on terror-crime networks is 
notable, particularly in the use of illicit markets to finance terrorist acts or their common 
capacity to flourish within fragile states. This association, while contested in scholarly circles, 
has penetrated policy discourses—even in the context of the Western Balkans16—to the point 
that it is increasingly difficult to find security agendas that refer to terrorism without 
organised crime, emphasising the same or similar strategies to tackle both perceived threats. 
As elaborated in the next section, the link is most visible in crisis management capabilities, 
including those of the EU, that have been built up with external operations in mind, but that, 
once established, have been perceived as serving Western internal security concerns. 
 
Externalising EU Internal Security Needs and Interests 
 The above analysed globalisation of insecurity implies that countries must adapt to a 
changed security environment of porous boundaries and complex threats (e.g. transnational 
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crime, organised crime, terrorism and corruption), which follows the erosion of state security 
after internal conflict and violence. In order to combat these threats, the international 
community has promulgated a particular vision of how states should organise themselves 
internally based on the principles of liberal democracy and market-oriented economics.17 In 
this regard, the EU has adopted the democracy and good governance agendas that reflect 
domestic values that the EU considers should be promoted in peacebuilding and the 
reconstruction of post-conflict states.18 Following ‘common European values and interests’19, 
the EU is committed to providing: security or freedom from fear; economic prosperity or 
freedom from want; political freedom (democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of 
law); and social well-being (health, education, and a clean environment).20  
Yet, a parallel exclusive and defensive approach to European security—aiming at the 
removal and/or containment of the perceived threats—has become predominant. The growing 
perception of a security deficit in the Union—coming from its neighbourhood—has created 
an ‘internal security field’; that is, ‘a domain of practices and ideas which presuppose[s] a 
single “security continuum” along which the issues of immigration and asylum are closely 
linked to concerns with organised crime, terrorism and anti-drugs policy’.21 This blurring 
between internal and external security has led to the so-called ‘internal-external security 
nexus’,22 a reasoning whereby the EU is seen as advancing the internal security concerns and 
interests of at least some of its member states by using foreign policy tools. Clear evidence of 
this can be found in the 2003 European Security Strategy, the EU guidebook on external 
action objectives: ‘the post-Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in 
which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked’.23 Moreover, the 
EU explicitly acknowledged the existence of a linkage between internal and external security 
in its 2005 strategy on the external dimension of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) issues.24 
Similarly, the Draft Internal Security Strategy for the EU adopted by the Council of the EU in 
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February 2010 seeks to define a European Security Model that, among other, relies on 
‘greater interdependence between internal and external security’.25 And, in February 2011, the 
European Parliament Draft Report on the Development of the Common Security and Defence 
Policy clearly states that ‘the internal and external aspects of EU security should be treated as 
complementary dimensions of the same strategy’.26 
 As the ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ expands and deepens within the Union, 
the outer edges grow sharper. The dangerous outside is seen as having moved closer after 
enlargement so that there is no buffer zone between the core and the outside.27 This 
development drives the EU to strengthen its external borders. Consequently, as Rees argued, 
EU internal security objectives increasingly permeate foreign policy agreements with third 
countries, whether in the fight against crime, the combat of international drug trafficking or 
migration.28 Specifically, the European Security Strategy mentions: 
 
The European Union and Member States have intervened to help deal 
with regional conflicts and to put failed states back on their feet, 
including in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and the DRC. Restoring good 
governance to the Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling the 
authorities there to tackle organised crime is one of the most effective 
ways of dealing with organised crime within the EU. 29  
 
As our analysis below demonstrates, police reform processes may relegate—if necessary—
good governance and democratic principles to a second place, in favour of capacity building 
for the fight against organised crime. Moreover, this strategy and other key documents say 
little about root causes and underlying injustices that create and perpetuate insecurity around 
certain threats for the EU.  
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 As numerous EU officials admit informally, the EU actively engages in the Western 
Balkans in line with a policy of ‘we help them to help ourselves’.30 This logic could explain 
why and how internal security values increasingly permeate the foreign policy domain. 
Internal security resources and capabilities—police officers falling under the Ministries of 
Interior, judges, prosecutors and customs officials—are utilised in peace support operations 
(including CSDP missions) for foreign policy purposes. The idea of linking ‘their’ 
development with ‘our’ security pre-dates 9/11 and indeed, was predominant throughout the 
1990s. One could refer, for example, to the Declaration of the Zagreb Summit (November 
2000). It emphasised the importance of regional cooperation in the Western Balkans 
(particularly between Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Albania and at the time the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia) to reinforce the fight against organised crime, corruption, money 
laundering, illegal migration and various forms of trafficking, in exchange for the prospect of 
accession to the EU through the Stabilisation and Association Process. Within this framework 
of reinforced regional cooperation, emphasis was given to the need to train police officers and 
magistrates as well as strengthening border controls.31 However, the question is to what extent 
in the post-9/11 period the policy is more about ‘ourselves’ than about ‘them’. In this respect, 
the 2011 European Parliament report on CSDP post-Lisbon Treaty acknowledges that the 
9/11 attacks have made the internal-external nexus particularly evident when fighting certain 
threats (which in the report include terrorism, organised crime, cybercrime, drugs and 
trafficking in human beings).32 
 As Karen Smith demonstrates, there is a certain inconsistency between discourse and 
practice: the externalisation of JHA empowers EU institutions to act within new competences 
by adding extra leverage for the EU in terms of international ‘actorness’, through, for 
example, CSDP police missions.33 This has led to the securitisation of the CSDP, whereby it 
is reshaped through institutional restructuring and the introduction of new ideas, norms and 
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procedures in tandem with EU political interests so that the underlying objective becomes the 
fight against alleged EU internal and external threats.34 In support of this argument, the 
Lisbon Treaty stipulates that the enhanced Petersberg Tasks ‘may contribute to the fight 
against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their 
territories’.35 
 
The Politics of EU Police Reform  
 The externalisation of internal security concerns has also manifested itself through 
policing practices, which increasingly extend across borders and for generations have 
reflected ambitious Western efforts to export their own definitions of ‘crime’ and promote 
their own values to other parts of the world.36 Consequently, short-term needs of Western 
powers to fight terrorism and respond to trafficking and migration are seen as likely to infuse 
most SSR assistance (including police reform and rule of law). This trend emphasises police 
effectiveness at the expense of the long-term aspiration to promote democratic policing, such 
as training for human rights protection for trafficked persons, which are highly relevant to 
‘the attainment of political, social and economic reconstruction, rehabilitation and good 
governance’.37 EU police missions, which comprise ‘strengthening missions’ (support) and 
‘substitution missions’ (executive), have also followed this logic.  
 A comprehensive concept for CSDP police strengthening missions, which constitutes 
the core activity of EU policing, was initially drafted in 2002 and updated in 2009.38 Its stated 
general objective is,  
 
to (re)establish or to strengthen and improve, under local ownership, a 
sustainable, transparent and accountable police system in the host country, 
to improve its police/law enforcement capacities and to ensure the home 
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country police/law enforcement services are able to undertake the full range 
of law enforcement functions with strict respect for human rights, 
fundamental freedoms and within a broader Rule of Law perspective in 
accordance with the demands of a democratic society.39  
 
In an effort to portray police reform as an integral part of its statebuilding/peacebuilding 
approach, the EU tackles police reform in numerous external objectives (integrated in the 
European Commission - EC), which it portrays as complementary. It links conflict prevention 
with the promotion of human rights, development with security, crisis management 
(CFSP/CSDP) with SSR policies which aim to promote good governance. Indeed, the 
Council’s document on SSR, which constitutes the broader framework for action on police 
reform, contains a similar set of objectives to those outlined above. It argues that the EU 
could provide assistance in a range of areas, from administration, transparency and 
accountability to launching public awareness campaigns to build societal trust, and education 
in the principles of modern policing, human rights, international and gender issues. The EC 
concept document on SSR follows the same line of argument, presenting policies and 
financial instruments that can help develop the governance side of police reform/assistance, 
such as civilian oversight, de-politicisation, civil society relations, to name a few.40  
 Yet, the move toward the SSR approach is particularly indicative of the creeping of 
EU member state interests to the EU level, and with it, EU internal security concerns. 
Specifically, the development of SSR missions was heavily influenced by UK efforts  
during its presidency of the Council of the EU (July-December 2005) to integrate its foreign 
policy interests into the EU agenda policy, but also to promote the ‘whole of government’ 
approach to intervening in conflict and post-conflict environments.41 In practice, this has led 
to the recognition that it is imperative to tackle rule of law in a comprehensive manner in line 
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with the good governance agenda, and thus reform the judiciary and penitentiary systems in a 
conflict-torn country in parallel with the police, the approach followed in Kosovo.42 The 
significance of this synergetic approach—an important lesson identified in the police missions 
in the Western Balkans43—is also spelled out in the revised 2009 EU comprehensive concept 
for police support missions.  
 The ‘internal-external security nexus’ has also led to a thickening of police 
cooperation, the creation of EU cross-border policing institutions and an outward extension of 
EU policing priorities and practices to the immediate neighbours. In this regard, it is worth 
noting the Police Cooperation Convention for South East Europe signed in May 2006 (during 
the Austrian Presidency of the Council of the EU) by Romania, Moldova, Albania, Bosnia, 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. These countries pledged to enhance their cooperation in 
the areas of information sharing and communication, training and joint threat analysis 
(particularly in relation to organised crime, illegal migration and human trafficking).44 
Moreover, cooperation between the JHA and CSDP policies, especially at strategic and 
intelligence levels, is considered a prerequisite to effective threat identification and analysis.45 
The signature of a cooperation agreement between EUROPOL (European Police Office) and 
the Council Secretariat on sharing information on CSDP missions in 2005—e.g. in the case of 
EULEX Kosovo—constitutes a concrete example of the link between internal and external 
security. Furthermore, JHA and CSDP bodies in the Council have engaged in more active 
coordination (regular meetings, exchange of information and personnel).46 The political 
ramifications of the internal-external nexus include EU member states deploying high quality 
border guards and organised crime experts to civilian operations. According to Dwan, EUPM 
in Bosnia has received support in its call for organised crime experts because of the interest of 
many interior ministries and police departments in EU member states to block smuggling and 
crime routes crossing the Balkans.47  
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 Contrary to the EC’s long-term approach, CSDP police missions were designed to 
deliver police aid that aims first and foremost at speedy effects, not at sustainable solutions to 
internal security problems. The Council admits that CSDP missions have an intrusive and 
result-oriented mandate. They are undertaken when the Council—through the political clout 
of the EU member states—wants to retain political control and strategic direction. This 
applies particularly to those situations where it is important to regularly exercise pressure on 
local authorities or actors in order to achieve the desired results.48 Consequently, CSDP police 
missions can become a medium for creeping EU member state internal security concerns in 
foreign policy. EU police officers are ‘co-located’ in local police institutions to carry out the 
formula of ‘monitoring, mentoring and advising’ (MMA): they are deployed at different 
hierarchical and territorial levels and are involved in a variety of tasks ranging from 
monitoring and teaching techniques of investigation, examination, search and territory control 
to hands-on training for personnel.49  
 In addition to the civilian police capabilities committed in June 1999, some EU 
member states undertook to provide rapidly deployable police elements, notably Integrated 
Police Units and Formed Police Units (IPU and FPU), including the creation of a European 
training dimension. The police reform process is allegedly embedded in the dictum of 
‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the population in conflict-torn environments. However, 
Merlingen and Ostrauskaite note that CSDP missions ‘encourage a controlling policing style’ 
that has the potential to undercut, albeit unintentionally, the development of an interface 
between the indigenous police and civil society actors/citizens, thus hindering accountable 
policing.50 Equally, Ryan argues that the reforms introduced through EU police assistance 
ignore the needs of the local populations and thus, merely provide ‘an impression of internal 
security’ in order to mask their actual goal, that of ‘insulating’ EU member states from these 
unstable societies.51 The underlying discourse here is that police reform has been ‘based on 
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technical fixes’52 and conceived as a technocratic process—tackling specific sectors for 
reform using specific methodologies—but the process is by no means apolitical. On the 
contrary, as Paris explains, institution building reforms in (post)-conflict societies are not 
ideologically neutral.53 
 
Exporting the EU Agenda through Police Reform in Macedonia 
 Police reform in Macedonia has its source in the Ohrid Framework Agreement (13 
August 2001) agreed upon following the inter-ethnic strife between ethnic Albanians and 
Macedonians and the Stabilisation and Association Agreement signed with Macedonia on 9 
April 2001. The stated objective is the strengthening of a multi-ethnic and democratic police, 
judiciary and prosecution services ‘in accordance with European Union models, standards and 
best practices’.54 However, the EU police reform in Macedonia, particularly when conducted 
through the CSDP missions there, focused primarily on ‘hard’ policing emphasising crime 
fighting (e.g. countering organised crime) rather than ‘soft’ policing, whose objectives 
included developing inter-ethnic relations, strengthening the respect for human rights and 
embedding good governance. This approach to police reform has compromised the 
performance of the Macedonian police.55 
 The EC has assisted the long-term institutional development and structural changes to 
enhance police transparency, accountability and professionalism. Since 2000, it concentrated 
on the establishment of new institutions, structures and chains of responsibility in the Ministry 
of Interior and the police. However, a close look at key strategic documents underpinning the 
reform of the Macedonian police—the National Police Reform Strategy, the Action Plan for 
Fighting Organised Crime, the Strategy for Integrated Border Management and the Action 
Plan for Migration and Asylum—whose drafting and adoption the EC supported and 
influenced, points to issues that aim to bolster EU internal security interests.56 Similarly, EC 
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assistance to police reform through Twinning programmes and technical assistance, have 
concentrated on border police, the fight against cross-border illegal activities, and corruption 
in the Public Prosecution Office.57 While the professed aim was to ensure democratic control 
and oversight of the police, the emphasis was put on the reinforcement of control of 
Macedonian borders to stop perceived threats in the country from spilling over into EU 
territory, according to the logic of the internal-external security nexus. In that spirit, new 
departments were established in the Public Prosecutor’s Office to combat organised crime and 
corruption; the National Central Offices of INTERPOL (International Criminal Police 
Organisation) were upgraded; and a Professional Standards Unit was created in the Ministry 
of the Interior (MoI) to investigate corruption cases in the police.58  
 The two CSDP police missions—EUPOL Proxima (2003-2005) and EUPAT (six 
months in 2006)—aimed to facilitate the implementation of police reform through 
monitoring, mentoring and advising the Macedonian police. The mandate objectives included: 
the consolidation of law and order, including the fight against organised crime, focusing on 
the former crisis areas; the practical implementation of the comprehensive reform of the 
Interior Ministry, including the police; the operational transition towards and the creation of 
a border police; confidence-building measures between the police and the local population; 
and enhanced cooperation with neighbouring states in the field of policing. Therefore, three 
out of four of the objectives (in italics) of Proxima’s mandate focused on satisfying EU 
internal security concerns. Indeed, a participant in Proxima’s fact-finding mission admitted in 
confidence that although human rights issues in Macedonia faced substantial shortcomings, 
they were not given a key place in the mission activities and programmes.59  
 In addition, whereas during the first year of its existence, Proxima had been unable to 
tackle the more demanding facets of its mandate, namely countering organised crime, this 
very aim was further strengthened with the extension of Proxima’s mandate. Consequently, 
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the mission had, from August 2004 onwards, essentially aimed at the improvement of crime 
scene management, border policing and the capacity of the UBK—the agency tasked with 
state security and counter-intelligence—to plan and manage operations to counter terrorism 
and fight organised crime. Although smaller in size, the subsequent CSDP mission, EUPAT, 
concentrated on the same issues as Proxima.60 Its focus on organised crime was said to allow 
the ‘advisory team’ to act as an ‘early warning mechanism in case things flared up in 
Kosovo’.61  
 Moreover, the efficiency of international programmes—meeting the set deliverables 
on paper—over the sustainability of police reforms was prioritised. An EU police officer 
admitted his frustration when dealing with badly trained Macedonian police officers. These 
joined the police ranks to meet the quotas for female and minority police officers—as part of 
the prerogatives agreed upon in the Ohrid Framework Agreement—rather than ensure that 
Macedonian police are well-trained and able to meet international standards of policing, 
including the respect of human rights.62 
Despite ambitious goals and a largely cooperative local government, the 
transformation of the Macedonian police has been slow and cumbersome. Persisting ethnic 
Macedonian perceptions of ethnic Albanians as not trustworthy is exemplified in counter-
trafficking operations launched in the former crisis regions in Macedonia: ethnic Macedonian 
high level MoI officials chose not to involve their ethnic Albanian counterparts who they 
suspect would inform the presumed perpetrators of the impending police operation.63 
International observers cite corruption, lack of transparency and political pressure within the 
MoI as lagging behind.64 In its latest report, the European Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment noted that ‘it is not convinced 
that the Sector for Internal Control and Professional Standards can be considered as an 
independent body which is able to carry out prompt, thorough and effective investigations’, 
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although there were improvements with aggressive internal investigations and an active 
ombudsman.65 Law enforcement officers (especially the Special Mobile Units known as Alfa 
Units)66 and prison officials are accused of using excessive force during the apprehension of 
criminal suspects, abusing detainees and prisoners, not adequately investigating such 
allegations, and discriminating against minorities.67 In line with the argument that the EU is 
preoccupied with internal security needs, the latest EC multi-annual indicative planning 
document for Macedonia for 2009-2011 points out that, ‘continued efforts have to be 
undertaken to adopt and implement a strategic plan for the development of administrative 
structures and capacities for the management of migration and visa issues, as well as 
guidelines for processing asylum cases.’68 Admittedly and despite Proxima's shortcomings, 
the persisting lacunas in the police reform are also, among other, the result of the non-renewal 
of the mission's mandate—at a moment when the mission was beginning to bear fruit69—a 
decision that was predetermined for political reasons.70 
While progress on democratic policing is lagging behind, the fight against organised 
crime has seen some results. With the demarcation of a border at Blace in October 2009 
following the establishment of diplomatic relations between Skopje and Pristina, the path to 
completing border police reform in Macedonia was opened. This development has allowed 
the Macedonian and Kosovo respective special police forces to work together, which has 
resulted, for example, in the confiscation of war arsenal near Blace, on the Kosovo-
Macedonian border, and the conduct of joint patrols. The Macedonian police have also 
managed, among other, to crack down on trafficking of counterfeit goods in Sutka, the Roma 
suburb of the Macedonian capital.71  
 While this is notable progress, the concentration on particular facets of the police 
reform (i.e. short-term effectiveness) has compromised the broader peacebuilding process, 
since the police reform remains disconnected from policies that would help promote long-
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term inter-ethnic relations and socio-economic development. These include, among other, 
police training at management level on human rights, gender mainstreaming, and the 
implementation of relevant laws beyond simple legislative adoption. Such steps are necessary 
since it is increasingly clear that inter-ethnic relations in the country are deteriorating and 
intra-ethnic disputes within the ethnic Albanian community are particularly challenging. As 
the EU has pointed out, this socio-political scenario could negatively impact the integration of 
Macedonia into the EU.72 While there still seems to be no political will to create a cross-
ethnic Macedonian identity, the job market remains dependent on the grey economy and 
necessary foreign investment is limited, which breads corruption since uniformed personnel 
(army and police) are also directly affected by unemployment.73  
 
Re-focusing the EU Police Mandate in Bosnia 
 EUPM arrived in Bosnia on 1 January 2003 intending to contribute both to the peace 
implementation process and the country’s preparation for EU membership.74 Its objective has 
been to raise police standards through local ownership and best European and international 
police practices. It has relied on a monitoring, mentoring and inspecting mandate and a co-
location strategy at mid and senior management ranks at state, entity, cantonal and Brcko 
levels.75 The first mandate or EUPM I (2003-2005) included organised crime and corruption 
among its strategic priorities. This resulted—among other—in two, out of seven, programmes 
dedicated exclusively to the state-level institutions with the greatest impact on the fight 
against organised crime and other cross-border criminal activities: the BiH Border Police and 
the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA). Admittedly strengthening state-level 
institutions was also part of the process of building Bosnian statehood. There were also 
special projects on ‘Major and Organised Crime’ and the ‘Fight and Intervention against 
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Human Trafficking’. The cumulative effect was the introduction of intelligence-led policing 
practices, training and organisational structures.76  
 Merlingen and Ostrauskaite have argued that EUPM I was influenced by the 
conviction—shared with other international actors—that organised crime was the main police 
problem in Bosnia.77 Simultaneously they highlight the numerous ‘low-key peacebuilding 
activities’ launched in the 2003-2005 mandate.78 Indeed, despite a slow start and a 
multiplicity of operational problems, organised crime and corruption co-existed with three 
other strategic priorities: police independence and accountability; financial viability and 
sustainability; and institution- and capacity-building. Some of the ensued reforms helped fight 
organised crime and corruption (e.g. the Public Complaint Bureaus), but others fell directly in 
the areas of de-politicisation, sustainable police numbers, gender and minority recruitment, 
human rights, police education, police-media-public relations and community policing. 
EUPM’s aim was to establish a sustainable, professional, multi-ethnic police that ‘mirrored at 
all levels the ethnic and cultural diversity [of Bosnian society]’.79 These reforms were 
necessary to complete unfinished work from the UN period (1995-2002) regarding the 
development of a ‘democratic policing’ framework in accordance with the objectives of the 
Dayton Peace Accords. In sum, the 2003-2005 period had important aspects of what could be 
described as a ‘classic peacebuilding mandate’ with a stabilisation goal in mind.80  
 Persistent concerns in Brussels and some European capitals over the impact of 
organised crime on their internal security needs, combined with the lessons from the 
enlargement to Romania and Bulgaria and the candidate status granted to Croatia and 
Macedonia, are behind the gradual consolidation of organised crime discourses within EUPM 
from 2006 onwards.81 Disagreement among EU member states over the possibility of having 
an executive mandate, with those in favour possibly motivated by perceptions of the 
organised crime threat emanating from Bosnia, characterised debates before the launch of 
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EUPM II.  The executive mandate was never introduced but instead EUPM II and III (2006-
2007, 2008-2009) were narrower in focus and more pro-active.82 They were mandated to 
assist with the planning and conduct of organised crime investigations and operationalising 
the inspection side of the mandate, which had not been really implemented during the 2003-
2005 period.83 ‘Mobile inspection teams’ were deployed—using both EUPM and local 
resources—to deal with cases considered complex, time-consuming or not properly treated by 
the local police, often in the areas of corruption, misuse of power and misconduct. These 
teams also aimed to help build a working relationship between the police and prosecutors, an 
area that was slowing down a more effective fight against organised crime. The fact that 
EUPM also included in its ranks judges and prosecutors facilitated the teams’ work.84   
 EUPM II and III also had responsibilities in the police reform sector, which primarily 
translated into technical assistance to the police restructuring process. This top-down, ‘micro-
managed’ process (led by the OHR and the EU)85 advocated from 2004 the ‘centralisation’ 
and ‘rationalization’ of police structures to tackle the fragmentation and thus, inefficiency, of 
the existing police system. Some of the projects in the 2003-2005 period (e.g. minority and 
gender recruitment, community policing) remained unfinished by the time EUPM II began. 
Bosnian police agencies took over those projects under EUPM supervision.86 In 2009, the 
International Crisis Group concluded that the police had become one of the most trusted 
institutions in the country.87 Important as this is, it is concerning that as late as 2009 the 
existing data also showed that some law enforcement agencies had not yet met the ‘national 
representation’ (or ethnic quotas) clauses of their respective Law on Police Officials. This 
obligation has not been abandoned but merely sidelined, despite its ongoing impact on the 
police’s daily work (i.e. the phenomenon of unfilled ethnic positions). There were also 
important deficiencies by the end of 2009 in the number of female officers within police ranks 
(still below the stipulated 10 per cent European ratio), gender training and related legal 
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provisions.88 However, the EU discourse at the time—shared by at least some Bosnian law 
enforcement agencies—was still dominated by concerns over the country’s readiness to face 
adequately the problem of organised crime and corruption, something that the EC echoed in 
2010. Persistent legal and financial gaps, and insufficiently developed investigative practices 
and co-operation between and within law enforcement agencies, and between police and 
prosecutors, were some of the issues raised.89  
 Against this background, EUPM’s most recent mandate (EUPM IV, 2010-2011) takes 
the fight against organised crime and corruption a step further. EUPM continues to assist with 
some specific investigations. However, the ‘hands-on’ methodology is largely substituted by a 
structural approach that emphasises co-ordination, co-operation and communication at 
national, regional and international levels, between police-prosecutor-penitentiary sectors and 
with a particular emphasis on state-level agencies (as illustrated by its co-location policy).90 
The results of this new approach include the signing or ratification of bilateral agreements 
between Bosnia and Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro on security matters (mainly terrorism, 
illegal drug trafficking and organised crime) and border management (including joint 
patrols).91  
 EUPM IV has retained ‘residual capacities’ in the fields of police reform and 
accountability, but the fight against organised crime and corruption has been prioritised.92 
These residual capacities are mostly related to the mission’s contribution to the 
implementation of the 2008 Police Laws that resulted from the police restructuring process. 
The implementation of these laws has proven slow and challenging due to the country’s 
political but also financial situation since 2006. This process includes the establishment of the 
BiH Directorate for Coordination of Police Bodies. This new state-level agency is responsible 
for international police co-operation (including EUROPOL and INTERPOL), VIP protection 
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and providing the institutional framework for the co-ordination of state-level law enforcement 
agencies.93   
 EUPM’s growing focus on organised crime and corruption is questionable on two 
grounds. First, it is undeniable that organised crime is an important issue in Bosnia but its 
portrayal as the main police problem is contested. EUPM’s refocusing is therefore debatable. 
Merlingen and Ostrauskaite have argued that EU evaluations are ‘as much based on 
speculation as on empirics’.94 These evaluations do not seem to be shared by, for example, the 
UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).95  
 Second, the solutions advocated to fight organised crime and corruption have 
primarily come in the form of training, technology transfer and organisational changes. 
However, necessary ‘social crime-prevention strategies’ that take into account the difficult 
Bosnian socio-economic context have not been adequately incorporated into the police reform 
process.96 This situation applies to the development of strategies to fight organised crime and 
corruption, but also when considering the impact those decisions have for the local 
population. A case in point is visa liberalisation—granted to Bosnia in 2010—but where 
political/security imperatives tend to weigh more for EU member states than developmental 
needs on the ground.97 As summarised by an EC official as early as 2003, ‘what is good for 
peace in Bosnia and what is good for the needs of EU member states is not always the same 
thing’.98  
 The overreliance on transfer of skills and technologies to fight organised crime and 
corruption also brings to the fore questions over EUPM’s commitment to local ownership and 
sustainability, two of its identified goals as early as 2003.  EUPM has made important 
contributions in this regard in order to tackle the ‘dependency’ problem that Bosnian police 
institutions seemed to have developed due to the more ‘intrusive’ approach of the preceding 
UN police mission.99 Simultaneously, financial limitations, work routines and workloads, and 
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organisational cultures have on occasion led to the underuse of the expensive networked 
computers, high-tech border equipment and trained officers introduced with EUPM technical 
assistance and EC funds. While these technologies follow best EU standards, they do not 
necessarily fit the Bosnian context. Longer-term behavioural reforms focusing on police 
management and culture, and a more realistic evaluation of what Bosnia can financially 
afford, are still required.100  Moreover, the sustainability of reforms introduced in the areas of 
transparency, accountability and cross-country standardization is not guaranteed. The capacity 
of police institutions to shield themselves from the type of ethnic/nationalist penetration that 
characterised it during the Bosnian war and the immediate post-conflict phase needs to be 
reinforced, something that the 2004-2008 police restructuring process and the ‘carrot’ of the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement did not accomplish.101 The impact of persisting 
ethnic/nationalist discourses is a real threat for democratic law enforcement in Bosnia. 
Current debates on the future of EUPM are therefore of great importance. EU member states 
are divided between the option of renewing the mandate or terminating the mission on 31 
December 2011 and transferring rule of law/police to the EUSR. The discussion is ongoing 
but the ‘in between’ option is a six-month renewal of EUPM (until July 2012), with a small 
group of experts focusing primarily on the strategic/political dimensions of law enforcement 
and criminal justice and helping the EUSR prepare to take over these tasks. Nonetheless, 
organised crime will remain a heavy influence in EU-Bosnian relations, as evident from the 
requirements of the accession process.102 
 
Top-down EU Police-building in Kosovo 
In an environment that is far more complex than either Macedonia or Bosnia due to 
Kosovo’s unclear political status, the European Union launched on 9 December 2008 its 
biggest and financially most lavish civilian intervention abroad to date, the Rule of Law 
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Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo. The mission is in principle ‘status neutral’ towards Kosovo’s 
independence, in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, since some EU 
member states do not recognise Kosovo sovereignty.103 However, the mission acts ‘status 
positive’—as a senior EULEX official explained—‘in order to be operational and have 
concrete output’.104 It is conceived as a joint effort with local authorities, in line with the local 
ownership principle, with a view to develop in Kosovo an independent multi-ethnic judiciary, 
police and customs service adhering to European best practices. It complements ongoing EC 
initiatives in rule of law reform, most notably, the Twinning project aiming to strengthen the 
professional capabilities of the Kosovo border police; the furbishing of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs; and the establishment of an independent prosecution service.  
Furthermore, EULEX retains some executive powers in the broader field of rule of 
law, particularly to investigate and prosecute serious crimes, carry out sensitive 
investigations, and ‘revers[e] or annul [when necessary] operational decisions taken by the 
competent Kosovo authorities’.105 ‘The key priorities of the mission’, as the Council explicitly 
noted, ‘are to address immediate concerns regarding corruption and the fight against 
organised crime’.106 Terrorism and money-laundering have been added to the mission's 
priorities in the past year, as the updated EULEX Kosovo website attests107, further 
strengthening the mission’s orientation towards tackling organised crime. Local stakeholders 
and Kosovo society tend to perceive the objectives, legal mandate and activities of the EU 
mission as a continuation of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)’s failed 
policies.108 
EULEX took over the rule of law functions previously led by UNMIK, which was 
created for an open-ended period of time in 1999. The Kosovo Police Service (KPS)—at just 
over 7,500 well-trained officers, including ethnic Albanians, Serbs, Bosniaks and Turks and 
an impressive 15 per cent of female officers109—is the second most trusted institution in 
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Kosovo (after the Kosovo Protection Corps–KPC), probably also because it is perceived as a 
bastion against possible Serbian aggression.110 According to the latest EC progress report on 
Kosovo, the KPS has reached a satisfactory level in overall policing (i.e. maintaining public 
peace and order and combating minor crimes) and also recently in riot control.111 
Given that the KPS is one of the most developed security institutions in Kosovo, it 
may seem paradoxical that EULEX police is the biggest component. Not only does it count 
1,600 experts (1200 internationals and 400 locals)112, but it also heavily weighs on the 
executive side. It comprises special police, crowd and riot control police, ‘executive police’ 
(including a war crimes unit, a witness protection unit and a financial unit) in addition to the 
‘strengthening police’. The special police department alone has over 550 police officers 
deployed in EULEX containers prepared to react for crowd and riot control, if needed.113 
This continuing focus on policing in Kosovo results from the fact that the KPS 
constitutes the main tool for the fight against organised crime, a security challenge which also 
compromises the work of the KPS. Despite progress on technical policing skills and overall 
policing—as described in the EC progress report on Kosovo—experts argue that the KPS is 
associated to the entanglement of structures of organised crime with the political class114, 
exposed to corruption because of the low salaries of KPS officers, and hampered by the dearth 
of equipment.115 The international community is accused of having contributed to the 
stabilisation of local organised crime power structures by allowing leading former Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) actors a major say in the political and societal reconstruction.116 
Although the KPS was not meant to succeed the KLA, former KLA fighters have joined the 
police force, leading to embedded corruption and links to organised crime. According to an 
official with years of experience in Kosovo, much was known about major criminal suspects 
in the public order institutions, but Embassies and foreign services of powerful states 
interfered with the work of international and domestic police. The United States is singled out 
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as a country hampering European law enforcement efforts.117 This situation has led to the 
phenomenon of so-called ‘multifunction persons’ who pursue political, economic and 
criminal interests simultaneously.118  
The ability of the KPS to fight serious crime is curtailed by the fact that crucial areas 
of crime-fighting (including intelligence sharing) remain the domaine réservé of 
internationals. EULEX staff has worked in the UNMIK INTERPOL Office; has established 
closer relations with the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative Centre (SECI), 
EUROPOL (with which it has signed an agreement for information sharing), and the 
European border management agency (FRONTEX); has signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR); and has liaised with and assisted the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The mission has 
contributed to the completion of strategies and action plans on integrated border management, 
the fight against organised crime, drugs, terrorism and more recently on migration control. It 
has played a significant role in initiating an ongoing legal co-operation between Serbia and 
Kosovo and a formal exchange of information with Belgrade to fight organised crime in the 
region. The mission has also used its executive powers in the areas of corruption and war 
crimes. Both EULEX judges and prosecutors and EULEX police have been variously 
involved—jointly with the KPS and the SPRK Anti-Corruption Task Force—in raids, 
searches, investigations, arrests and convictions, usually targeting high profile officials.119 
While these strategies have improved crime fighting, they also point to an absence of trust in 
the local institutions (in sharing intelligence) as well as a prioritisation of result oriented 
action over the creation of sustainable Kosovo crime fighting institutions.  
 The ‘strengthening police’ of the EULEX mission that implements activities through 
the MMA on management functions—work that requires primary staffing at station level 
across the country, at the borders and the airports—has remained largely invisible in day-to-
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day operations. The EULEX MMA tracking mechanism points to 36 areas of focus under 
police reform, out of which three have been deferred for lack of funds and more than half can 
be said to concentrate on ‘hard’ security issues. These include, among other, intelligence-led 
policing, criminal justice components, organised crime capability, strategy drafting for 
combating drug trafficking and illegal migration, numerous aspects of border policing 
(communication, planning and strategy development), and the development of intelligence 
systems.120 Since 2009 and using MMA activities, EULEX police is implementing an 
UNMIK-sponsored programme aiming to increase intelligence led policing capacities and to 
create a single crime intelligence strategy. However, structural and professional KPS capacity 
continues to face difficulties in the field of investigations (particularly in the area of data 
collection, collation and analysis for operation planning). This would imply that further 
training and better equipment—areas falling under long-term police reform—are needed. 
Moreover, in 2010, the EC reported that the Directorate against Economic Crime and 
Corruption in the KPS, responsible for police investigations on economic crimes and 
corruption, has been prone to political interferences.121 EULEX efforts to develop 
professionalism in the KPS have not managed to control this systemic deficiency.122 
EULEX officials link organised crime to socio-economic and political development 
arguing that it is corruption and organised crime that hamper the creation of a democratic 
political culture in Kosovo.123 Yet, it is real everyday problems that render life difficult in 
Kosovo. Smaller minorities—Bosniaks, Croats, Gorani, Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians, and 
Turks— suffer from discrimination due to association with the former Serb majority, lack of 
access to information or tertiary education in their own languages, and attacks and occupation 
of their homes.124 Serbs and Albanians living outside the main areas of their respective 
communities face similar difficulties. Despite the minority/ethnic quota system, the KPS finds 
it difficult to operate in minority areas because of poor investment in protection mechanisms 
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(victim and witness protection programmes and protection of property rights). Questions over 
which legal framework is applicable, how discretionary and subjective powers are enabled in 
security and justice matters, and who is in charge, are particularly problematic issues 
(especially in north Kosovo) and seriously hamper police work.125 
Simultaneously, the ability of EULEX to implement its ambitious mandate largely 
depends on the political circumstances surrounding its deployment. The mission has defined 
its tasks (emanating from its mandate) in a technical manner so as to avoid being caught up in 
the politics of non-recognition. The complex political situation north of the Ibar River, 
however, has held the mission back.126 The Pristina-Belgrade dialogue mediated by the EU 
since 8-9 March 2011 is likely to tackle some of the consequences of the dispute for control 
of rule of law, especially in view of the violent events at Gate 1 in Jarinje in late July 2011. 
Despite the reintegration of Serb police officers into the KPS in late June 2009, the 
international community considers north Kosovo ‘a lawless area’.127 Given the relatively 
small number of police officers engaged (318 in total, the majority of whom are Serb) 
compared to the territory they cover, the high rate of illegal activities and organised crime, the 
different parallel policing institutions, and the non-operational courts, efforts to establish law 
and order in the north are seriously compromised.128 Under these circumstances, EULEX is 
more a law enforcement mission in the north than an MMA mission. Yet, it is seen by many 
ethnic Albanians in Kosovo as a mere peacekeeper since it does not use its executive powers 
to arrest anyone working in the parallel security structures and/or engaged in criminal 
activities.129 The sensitive status question, however, necessitates that EULEX accommodates 
Serbian concerns. This includes the need to agree with Belgrade on the modalities of EULEX 
work north of the Ibar and the applicable laws, as well as Belgrade’s consent to deploy 
EULEX judges.  
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The absence of an EU policy on the future of Kosovo because of the divergence in EU 
member state positions has resulted in the EU being unable to take substantial steps to 
integrate Kosovo in the Stabilisation and Association Process. Thus, it is unable to establish a 
real prospect of EU integration.130 It also means that Kosovo cannot join the visa 
liberalisation regime (while every surrounding state has or is about to). More broadly, the 
EU—due to EU member state bickering—has no substantive long-term peacebuilding policy 
for Kosovo. Fundamental questions regarding EULEX raison d’être remain unanswered: for 
what and for who is EULEX creating security institutions? The direct consequence of this 
situation is that the EU does not have real leverage on Kosovo’s political leaders, since it does 
not recognise the very institutions whose development it is supporting.131 Yet, in order to 
progress in its crime fighting activities, EULEX needs the cooperation of local institutions to 
have access to the necessary evidence for the arrest of suspected culprits following its raids.  
 
Conclusion 
 The CSDP approach to police reform in the Western Balkans is heavily influenced by 
internal political and security concerns of the Union and its member states. It is to be 
expected, if one concedes to the line of thinking alluded to before, that of ‘we help them to 
help ourselves’. This approach ultimately prioritises effectiveness of policing, short-term 
crime fighting and often sidelines—perhaps involuntarily—necessary long-term police 
reforms that would ensure the sustainability of the process (e.g. meeting gender and minority 
quotas; supporting human rights and specialised training at all levels; engendering inter-ethnic 
relations; guaranteeing that legislative and structural changes are implemented; ensuring the 
systemic functionality of the police). The real challenge comes when the CSDP approach to 
police reform leads to reforms that do not push forward peacebuilding in the conflict ridden 
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society and therefore contribute insufficiently—if at all—to the democratic and good 
governance agenda, as illustrated with the cases of Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo.  
 An assessment of EU police reform in Macedonia four years following the end of the 
CSDP police missions demonstrates that an over-emphasis on crime fighting rather than long-
term police reform, which could help realise a change in the work ethics and behaviour of the 
Macedonian police, has met societal and political resistance affecting the functioning of the 
Macedonian police. In Bosnia, the EU’s commitment to fight organised crime and corruption 
has gradually led to mandates narrower in scope and more pro-active in methods despite 
questions around the gravity of the threat and the appropriateness of those goals and methods 
to the longer-term needs of policing structures. In Kosovo, EULEX has prioritised its 
executive mandate, which it uses to counter corruption and fight organised and transborder 
crime. As a result, the EU mission bypasses sharing sensitive intelligence with the local 
institutions but simultaneously fails to build local crime fighting capacity. Moreover, the 
absence of a long-term EU policy on the unresolved status question due to differing EU 
member state positions on the recognition of Kosovo compromises EU political leverage on 
police reform.   
 The EU’s pattern of behaviour seems to go in tandem with broader trends that are 
permeating development and security policies of key international actors in the post-9/11 
world. The conclusions drawn in this article add to those voices that warn against the use of 
short-term gains in the ‘war’ against terrorism, organised crime and other transnational threats 
as the new defining lines for intervention strategies in countries suffering from crises of 
governance.  
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